OUR COLUMNIST AVILA REACTS TO MY REVIEW OF YNGVE HOLEN’S SHOW AT STUART SHAVE’S GALLERY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:
‘Well… I’m also please to reannounce that Yngve Holen’s show “allias the honeycomber conceptualist” at Stuart Shave’s gallery is for all purposes a fatalistic event…
The reality is that Yngve’s pseudo physical and mental exertion for transforming the viewer into some sort of conceptual production line worker has the opposite effect to what he probably wanted to achieved .”Yngve Holen’s sculptures draw upon industrial technologies and their relationships to production engineering, problems of replaceability, the consumer experience, and the images and discourses through which all these are represented.” I mean… how can anybody understand the complexity of a modern manufacturing process and everything that surrounds it by showing a finish model of it and some scattered parts laying on a rauchy table? I would rather decode in detail the battle of Waterloo with lead soldiers, than trying to figure out how vacuum forces work when flushing a camout at hight altitudes, in the absence of a flight attendant that could explain me why we need on airplanes presurized toilets…
Yngve Holen should not rely (like Napoleon) solely on his experience to depict the representation of our consumeristic world; but instead, he should establish a concrete plan to define it, including having the possibility of a forced retreat:
On the 14th of June, 1815, the Napoleonic army, which was made up of 69,000 men, reached Charleroi about fifteen miles south of Brussels. There, to their left about fifteen miles away, 67,000 Anglo-Dutch troops were organizing themselves under the direction of the Duke of Wellington. To his right about ten miles away, 50,000 Prussian troops awaited the orders of their Commander General Friedrich Von Blucher.
Napoleon’s biggest preoccupation since the start of his campaign was the unification of those two forces, which could result in one giant army made up of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The Duke of Wellington, during the confusion implied in coordinating the movements of his soldiers and simultaneously discerning the intentions of the enemy’s army, decided to have a backup plan founded on previous surveys of the area, where he acquired the best information about the terrain to fight a possible battle. This backup plain included the retreat of his troops towards Brussels.
On the 16th of June, a portion of the Prussian troops and some of the Anglo-Dutch troops confronted the fast moving French troops at Ligny and at Quatre-Bras. Both battles were lost by the coalition forces and that is when Napoleon’s biggest blunder happened. The coalition troops retreated according to their plans towards Waterloo. On the 18th of June, the Duke of Wellington was well positioned with the Anglo-Dutch army, awaiting the reinforcements from the Prussian troops that escaped partially unaffected by the indecisive tactics of the French army.
Waterloo was a well-coordinated trap. Napoleon couldn’t see in advance the movements of Wellington who had the advantage of a sloping terrain. To make matters worst, he delayed the start of the battle due to pouring rain the night before, which softened the fields, complicating the artillery’s placement. When the relentless Prussians got to the battle, the first thing they saw was an unbalanced French army, with its infantry grouped in large masses of troops deep into the battlefield. General Von Blucher realized that the French mobility was greatly reduced by the previous controversial advances of the enemy’s cavalry and their mostly ineffective artillery, so Blucher concentrated his troops in Napoleon’s right flank to divert the frontal attack against Wellington. The result was a U shaped formation of the French army fighting three fronts at the same time with poor results.
The French lost the battle of Waterloo because Napoleon had more confidence in his army than in his own planning. He underestimated the Duke of Wellington’s strategy, which was to force Napoleon to make a frontal attack with his imperial spirit on disadvantageous grounds. On the 16th and 17th of June, when the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian troops retreated towards the North after losing the battles at Ligny and at Quatre-Bras, Napoleon should had foreseen that the combination of those two armies was almost inevitable. Instead, he relied on the experience of his troops and the hopes of having the Anglo-Dutch forces panic at the sight of such a great army’